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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, wireless ad hoc sensor network becomes popular both in civil and military jobs. 
However, security is one of the significant challenges for sensor network because of their deployment 
in open and unprotected environment. As cryptographic mechanism is not enough to protect sensor 
network from external attacks, intrusion detection system needs to be introduced. Though intrusion 
prevention mechanism is one of the major and efficient methods against attacks, but there might be 
some attacks for which prevention method is not known. Besides preventing the system from some 
known attacks, intrusion detection system gather necessary information related to attack technique and 
help in the development of intrusion prevention system. In addition to reviewing the present attacks 
available in wireless sensor network this paper examines the current efforts to intrusion detection 
system against wireless sensor network. In this paper we propose a hierarchical architectural design 
based intrusion detection system that fits the current demands and restrictions of wireless ad hoc 
sensor network. In this proposed intrusion detection system architecture we followed clustering 
mechanism to build a four level hierarchical network which enhances network scalability to large 
geographical area and use both anomaly and misuse detection techniques for intrusion detection. We 
introduce policy based detection mechanism as well as intrusion response together with GSM cell 
concept for intrusion detection architecture. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a lot of research done on preventing or defending WSN from attackers and 
intruders, but very limited work has been done for detection purpose. It will be difficult for 
the network administrator to be aware of intrusions. There are some Intrusion Detection 
Systems that are proposed or designed for Wireless Ad hoc network. Most of them work on 
distributed environment; which means they work on individual nodes independently and try 
to detect intrusion by studying abnormalities in their neighbors’ behavior. Thus, they require 
the nodes to consume more of their processing power, battery backup, and storage space 
which turn IDS to be more expensive, or become unfeasible for most of the applications. 
Some of the IDS use mobile agents in distributed environment [8].  Mobile Agent supports 
sensor mobility, intelligent routing of intrusion data throughout the network, eliminates 
network dependency of specific nodes. But this mechanism still is not popular for IDS due to 
mobile agents’ architectural inherited security vulnerability and heavy weight. Some of the 
IDSs are attack-specific which make them concentrated to one type of attack [1] . Some of 
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them use centralized framework which make IDS capable exploiting a personal computer’s 
high processing power, huge storage capabilities and unlimited battery back up [21]. Most of 
the IDS are targeted to routing layer only  [7] [21], but it can be enhanced to detect different 
types of attacks at other networking layers as well. Most of the architectures are based on 
anomaly detection  [18] [2] which examine the statistical analysis of activities of nodes for 
detection. Most of the IDS techniques utilize system log files, network traffic or packets in the 
network to gather information for Intrusion detection. Some detects only intrusion and some 
do more like acquiring more information e.g. type of attacks, locations of the intruder etc. 
Though a handsome number of IDS mechanisms are proposed in Wireless ad hoc network but 
very few of them can be applicable for Wireless Sensor network because of their resource 
constrains. Self-Organized Criticality & Stochastic Learning based IDS [2], IDS for clustering 
based sensor Networks [3], A non-cooperative game approach [4], Decentralized IDS [5] are 
distinguished among them.  
 
2. EXISTING CHALLENGES 
Existing intrusion detection systems are not adequate to protect WSN from Inside and Outside 
attackers. None of them are complete. E.g. most of the approaches offer clustering techniques 
without mentioning how they will be formed and how will they behave with rest of the 
system. Most of the existing IDSs deal with wired architecture except their wireless 
counterpart. The architecture of WSN is even more sophisticated than ad hoc wireless 
architecture. So, an IDS is needed with capability of detecting inside and outside, known and 
unknown attacks with low false alarm rate. Existing IDS architecture that are specifically 
designed for sensor networks are suffering from lack of resources e.g. high processing power, 
huge storage capabilities, unlimited battery backup etc.  
 
 
3. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK - AN OVERVIEW 
 
According to NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) “a wireless ad hoc 
sensor network consists of a number of sensors spread across a geographical area” [8].  The 
term sensor network refers to a system which is a combination of sensors and actuators with 
some general purpose computing elements. A sensor network can have hundreds or even 
thousands of sensors; mobile or fixed locations; deployed to control or monitor [7]. 
 
A wireless sensor network comprises of sensor nodes to sense data from their ambience, and 
passes it on to a centralized controlling and data collecting identity called base station. 
Typically, base stations are powerful devices with a large storage capacity to store incoming 
data. They generally provide gateway functionality to another network, or an access point for 
human interface [21]. A base station may have an unlimited power supply and high 
bandwidth links for communicating with other base stations. In contrast, wireless sensors 
nodes are constrained to use low power, low bandwidth, and short range links. 
 
4. SECURITY THREATS AND ISSUES 
Various security issues and threats that are considered for wireless ad hoc network can be 
applied for WSN. This is recited in some previous researches. But the security mechanism 
used for wireless ad hoc networks cannot be deployed directly for WSNs because of their 
architectural inequality. First, in ad hoc network, every node is usually held and managed by a 
human user. Whereas in sensor network, all the nodes are independent and communication is 
controlled by base station. Second, Computing resources and batteries are more constrained in 
sensor nodes than in ad hoc nodes. Third, the purpose of sensor networks is very specific e.g. 
measuring the physical information (such as temperature, sound etc.). Fourth, node density in 
sensor networks is higher than in ad hoc networks [10]. Architectural aspect of WSN makes 
the security mechanism more prosperous as the base station could be used intelligently. 
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According to the basic need of security attacks in WSN can be categorized: 
 
• DoS, DDoS attacks which affect network availability 
• Eavesdropping, sniffing which can threaten confidentiality 
• Man-in-the-middle attacks which can affect packet integrity 
• Signal jamming which affects communication 
 
There are many research work has been done in the area of significant security problems. 
Here summery of existing well-known threats are discussed. 
 
Table 1: Threats and Attacks in WSN 
 
Attacks  Brief Description  
Attack on Information in transit Information that is to be sent can be modified, altered, 
replayed, spoofed, or vanished by attacker. 
Hello flood Attacker with high radio range sends more Hello packet to 
announce themselves to large number of nodes in the large 
network persuading themselves as neighbor.    
Sybil attack Fake multiple identities to attack on data integrity and 
accessibility. 
Wormhole attack  Transmit information between two WSN nodes in secret. 
Network partition attack  Threats to accessibility though there is a path between the 
nodes. 
Black Hole Attack The attacker absorbs all the messages.  
Sink Hole Attack Similar to black hole. Exception: the attacker advertises 
wrong routing information  
Selective Forwarding The attacker forwards messages on the basis of some Pre-
selected criterion  
Simple Broadcast Flooding The attacker floods the network with broadcast Messages. 
Simple Target Flooding The attacker tries to flood through some specific nodes.  
False Identity Broadcast Flooding Similar to simple broadcast flooding, except the attacker 
deceives with wrong source ID.  
False Identity Target 
Flooding 
Similar to simple target flooding, except the attacker 
deceives with wrong source ID. 
Misdirection Attack The attacker misdirects the incoming packets to a distant 
node. 
 
 
 
5. IDS ARCHITECTURE 
 
According to the Network Security Bible – “Intrusion detection and response is the task of 
monitoring systems for evidence of intrusions or inappropriate usage and responding to this 
evidence”[22].  The basic idea of IDS is to observe user as well as program activities inside 
the system via auditing mechanism.  
 
 
Depending on the data collection mechanism IDS can be classified into two categories: Host 
based IDS monitors log files (applications, Operating system etc.) and then compare with logs 
of present signature of known attacks from internal database.  Network based IDS works in 
different way. It monitors packets within communication and inspects suspicious packet 
information. 
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Depending on how attacks are detected, IDS architecture can be categorized into three types: 
Signature based IDS which monitors an occurrence of signatures or behaviors which is 
matched with known attacks to detect an intrusion. This technique may exhibit low false 
positive rate, but not good to detect previously unknown attacks. Anomaly based IDS defines 
a profile of normal behavior and classifies any deviation of that profile as an intrusion. The 
normal profile of system behavior is updated as the system learns the behavior. This type of 
system can detect unknown attacks but it exhibits high false positive. In [11] another type of 
Intrusion detection has been introduced. Specification based IDS defines a protocol or a 
program’s correct operations. Intrusion is indicated according to those constraints. This type 
of IDS may detect unknown attacks, while showing low false positive rate.  
 
In [11] wireless ad hoc network architecture is defined into three basic categories which can 
be adjusted to IDS in WSN architecture. 
 
Stand alone  
Each node acts as an independent IDS and detects attacks for itself only without sharing any 
information with another IDS node of the system, even does not cooperate with other 
systems. So, all intrusion detection decisions are based on information available to the 
individual node. Its effect is too limited. This architecture is best suited in an environment 
where all the nodes are capable of running an IDS [11]. 
 
Distributed and cooperative 
Though each node runs its own IDS, finally they collaborate to form a global IDS. This 
architecture is more suitable for flat wireless sensor networks, where a global IDS is initiated 
due to the occurrence of inconclusive intrusions detected by individual node.  
 
Hierarchical  
This architecture has been proposed for multilayered wireless network. Here network is 
divided into cluster with cluster-heads. Cluster-head acts like a small base station for the 
nodes within the cluster. It also aggregates information from the member nodes about 
malicious activities. Cluster-head detects attacks as member-nodes could potentially reroute, 
modify or drop packet in transmission. At the same time all cluster-heads can cooperate with 
central base station to form a global IDS.    
 
 
To build an effective IDS model, several considerations take place.  
First of all Detection Tasks:  How will they be separated? Local agent or Global agent. 
Whether Local or global agent, an IDS needs to consider how these agents would analyze the 
threats. And what would be right sources of information?  
Local Agent detects vulnerability of node’s internal Information. It supposed to be active 
100% of the time to ensure maximum security. Here Physical/Logical Integrity, 
Measurement Integrity, Protocol Integrity, Neighborhood are analyzed from nodes’ status. 
Global Agent:  To detect anomaly from external information of a node to achieve 100% 
coverage of a sensor network.  Here main challenges are balancing tasks and network 
coverage. In case of hierarchical network, cluster head (CH) controls its section of the 
network. CH is the part of global network. In case of flat network Spontaneous Watchdogs 
concept is applied. Here premise is “For every packet circulating in the network, there are a 
set of nodes that are able to receive both that packet and the relayed packet by the next hop.”  
 
Second consideration is Sharing Information between agents. Information between agents can 
be transmitted through cryptography, voting mechanism or trust depending on the network’s 
resource constraint.  
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Third consideration is how to Notify Users. Generally users are behind Base stations. So, 
different algorithms can be used to notify base station. E.g. uTesla use secure broadcast 
algorithm.   
 
There are different techniques for IDS in Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). Here we represent 
some existing IDS models for WSN. 
 
 
Table 2:  Comparative study on existing IDS 
 
Name of the 
Intrusion Detection 
System 
Data 
Collection 
Mechanism 
Detection 
technique 
Handled attacks Network 
Architecture 
Hybrid IDS for 
Wireless Sensor 
Network [6] 
Network 
based 
Anomaly 
based 
Selective forwarding, sink 
hole, Hello flood and 
wormhole attacks 
Hierarchical  
Decentralized IDS in 
WSN[5] 
Network 
based 
Anomaly 
based 
Repetition, Message Delay, 
Blackhole, Wormhole, 
Data alteration, Jamming, 
Message negligence, and 
Selective Forwarding 
Distributed 
Intrusion Detection 
in Routing attacks in 
Sensor Network [1] 
Host based Anomaly 
based 
DoS , active sinkhole 
attacks, and passive 
sinkhole. 
Distributed 
Sensor Network 
Automated Intrusion 
Detection System 
(SNAIDS)[9] 
Host based Signature 
based 
duplicate nodes, flooding, 
Black hole, Sink hole 
attack, selective 
forwarding, misdirection. 
Distributed 
Self-Organized 
critically & 
stochastic learning 
based IDS for 
WSN[2] 
Host based Anomaly 
based 
There is no guideline in 
this IDS model of which 
attacks it can resist and 
which cannot. 
Distributed 
 
6. OUR MODEL 
 
In this paper we propose a new model for IDS which concentrates on saving the power of 
sensor nodes by distributing the responsibility of intrusion detection to three layer nodes with 
the help of policy based network management system. The model uses a hierarchical overlay 
design(HOD). We divided each area of sensor nodes into hexagonal region (like GSM cells). 
Sensor nodes in each of the hexagonal area are monitored by a cluster node. Each cluster node 
is then monitored by a regional node. In turn, Regional nodes will be controlled and 
monitored by the Base station. 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Overlay Design 
This HOD based IDS combines two approaches of intrusion detection mechanisms (Signature 
and anomaly) together to fight against existing threats. Signatures of well known attacks are 
propagated from the base station to the leaf level node for detection. Signature repository at 
each layer is updated as new forms of attacks are found in the system. As intermediate agents 
are activated with predefined rules of system behavior, anomaly detection can take part from 
the deviated behavior of predefined specification. Thus proposed IDS can identify known as 
well as unknown attacks. 
 
6.1 Detection Entities 
Sensor Nodes have two types of functionality: Sensing and Routing. Each of the sensor nodes 
will sense the environment and exchange data in between sensor nodes and cluster node. As 
sensor nodes have much resource constraints, in this model, there is no IDS module installed 
in the leaf level sensor nodes.  
 Cluster Node plays as a monitor node for the sensor nodes. One cluster node is assigned for 
each of the hexagonal area. It will receive the data from sensor nodes, analyze and aggregate 
the information and send it to regional node. It is more powerful than sensor nodes and has 
intrusion detection capability built into it.  
 
Regional Node will monitor and receive the data from neighboring cluster heads and send the 
combined alarm to the upper layer base station. It is also a monitor node like the cluster nodes 
with all the IDS functionalities. It makes the sensor network more scalable. If thousands of 
sensor nodes are available at the leaf level then the whole area will be split into several 
regions. 
 
Base Station is the topmost part of architecture empowered with human support. It will 
receive the information from Regional nodes and distribute the information to the users based 
on their demand.  
 
6.2 Policy based IDS 
Policy implies predefined action pattern that is repeated by an entity whenever certain 
conditions occur [13].  The architectural components of policy framework include a Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), and a Policy repository. The policy 
rules stored in Policy repository are used by PDP to define rules or to show results. PDP 
translates or interprets the available data to a device-dependent format and configures the 
relevant PEPs. The PEP executes the logical entities that are decided by PDP [12].  These 
capabilities provide powerful functions to configure the network as well as to re-configure the 
system as necessary to response to network conditions with automation. In a large WSN 
where Hierarchical Network Management is followed can be realized by policy mechanism to 
achieve survivability, scalability and autonomy simultaneously. So in case of failure the 
system enables one component to take over the management role of another component. One 
of the major architectural advantages of hierarchical structure is any node can take over the 
functionality of another node dynamically to ensure survivability. A flexible agent structure 
ensures dynamic insertion of new management functionality.  
 
 
Hierarchical network management integrates the advantage of two (Central and Distributed) 
management models [14] and uses intermediate nodes (Regional and Cluster) to distribute the 
detection tasks. Each intermediate manager has its own domain called Regional or Cluster 
agent which collects and processed information from its domain and passes the required 
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information to the upper layer manager for further steps. All the intermediate nodes are also 
used to distribute command/data/message from the upper layer manager to nodes within its 
domain. It should be noted that there is no direct communication between the intermediate 
members.  Except the leaf level sensor nodes all the nodes in the higher level are configured 
with higher energy and storage. 
 
To achieve a policy-based management for IDS the proposed architecture features several 
components that evaluate policies: a Base Policy decision Point (BPDP), a number of Policy 
decision modules (PDMs) and Policy Enforcement Point(PEP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
BPDP: Base Policy Decision Point 
RPA: Regional Policy Agent 
LPA: Local Policy Agent 
SN: Sensor Node 
Figure 2: Hierarchical Architecture of IDS Policy Management 
 
Base Policy Decision Point (BPDP) is the controlling component of the architecture. It 
implements policies or intrusion rules generated by the Intrusion Detection Tool (IDT) from 
receiving events, evaluating anomaly conditions and applying new rules, algorithms, 
threshold values etc. IDT supports creation, deletion, modification, and examination of the 
agent’s configurations and policies. It can add new entities e.g. new signature of intrusion, 
modify or delete existing entities in RPA and LPA. 
Policy Decision Modules (PDMs) are components that implement sophisticated algorithms in 
relevant domains. LPAs and RPAs act as PDMs.  LPA manages the sensor nodes which is 
more powerful than sensor nodes. LPAs perform local policy-controlled configuration, 
filtering, monitoring, and reporting which reduces management bandwidth and computational 
overhead from leaf level sensor nodes to improve network performance and intrusion 
detection efficiency. An RPA can manage multiple LPAs. At the peak BPDP manages and 
controls all the RPAs. 
Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) are low level Sensor Nodes. 
 
Policies are disseminated from the BPDP to RPA to LPA as they are propagated from PDP to 
LPA. Policy agents described above helps IDS by reacting to network status changes globally 
or locally. It helps the network to be reconfigured automatically to deal with fault and 
performance degradation according to intrusion response.  
 
Base Station 
Intrusion Detection Agent 
Sensor Nodes 
BPDP 
RPA RPA 
LPA LPA LPA LPA
SN SN SN SN SN SN SN SN 
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6.3 Structure of Intrusion Detection Agent ( IDA ) 
The hierarchical architecture of policy management for WSN is shown in the above figure. It 
comprises of several hierarchical layers containing Intrusion Detection Agent (IDA) at each 
layer. They are Base Policy Decision Point (BPDP), Regional Policy Agent( RPA), Local 
Policy Agent (LPA), Sensor Node(SN). 
 
An IDA consists of the following components: Preprocessor, Signature Processor, Anomaly 
processor and Post processor. The functionalities are described as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Intrusion Detection Agent Structure 
 
Pre-Processor either collects the network traffic of the leaf level sensor when it acts as an 
LPA or it receives reports from lower layer IDA. Collected sensor traffic data is then 
abstracted to a set of variables called stimulus vector to make the network status 
understandable to the higher layer processor of the agent.  
 
Signature Processor maintains a reference model or database called Signature Record of the 
typical known unauthorized malicious threats and high risk activities and compares the 
reports from the preprocessor against the known attack signatures. If match is not found then 
misuse intrusion is supposed to be detected and signature processor passes the relevant data to 
the next higher layer for further processing.  
 
 Anomaly Processor analyzes the vector from the preprocessor to detect anomaly in network 
traffic. Usually statistical method or artificial intelligence is used in order to detect this kind 
of attack. Profile of normal activity which is propagated from Base station is stored in the 
database. If the activities arrived from preprocessor deviates from the normal profile in a 
statistically significant way, or exceeds some particular threshold value attacks are noticed. 
Intrusion detection rules are basically policies which define the standard of access mechanism 
and uses of sensor nodes. Here database acts as a Policy Information Base(PIB) or policy 
repository. 
 
 Post Processor prepares and sends reports for the higher layer agent or base station. It can be 
used to display the agent status through a user interface.   
Pre Processor 
Reports from lower level 
sensor / IDA 
Anomaly Processor 
Post Processor 
Signature Processor Signature 
Record 
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6.5 Selection of IDS node 
Activating every node as an IDS wastes energy. So minimization of number of nodes to run 
intrusion detection is necessary. In [15] three strategies are mentioned involving selection of 
Intrusion detection node.  
 
Core defense selects IDS node around a centre point of a subset of network. It is assumed that 
no intruder break into the central station in any cluster. This type of model defends from the 
most inner part then retaliates to the outer area. 
 
Boundary defense selects node along the boundary perimeter of the cluster. It provides 
defense on intruder attack from breaking into the cluster from outside area of the network. 
 
Distributed defense has an agent node selection algorithm which follows voting algorithm 
from [16] in this model. Node selection procedure follows tree hierarchy.  
 
Our model follows Core Defense strategy where cluster-head is the centre point to defend 
intruders.  In core defense strategy ratio of alerted nodes and the total number of nodes in the 
network drops, this makes energy consumption very low which make it more economical in 
their use of energy as it shows least number of broadcast message in case of attack. It has 
strong defense in inner network. Here IDS needs to wait for intruder to reach the core area 
[16] which is one of the drawbacks of this strategy as nodes can be captured without notice. 
 
6.6 IDS mechanism in sensor nodes  
Intrusions could be detected at multiple layers in sensor nodes (physical, Link, network and 
application layer).  
In Physical layer Jamming is the primary physical layer attack. Identifying jamming attack 
can be done by the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) [17] [18], the average time 
required to sense an idle channel (carrier sense time), and the packet delivery ratio (PDR). In 
case of wireless medium, received signal strength has relation with the distance between 
nodes. Node tampering and destruction are another physical layer attack that can be prevented 
by placing nodes in secured place. During the initialization process Cluster node’s LPA will 
store the RSSI value for the communication between Cluster node to leaf level sensor nodes 
and sensor to sensor node. Later, at the time of monitoring, Anomaly processor in LPA will 
monitor whether the received value is unexpected. If yes, it will feedback RPA by generating 
appropriate alarm.  
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Figure 4: IDS mechanism 
Link Layer attacks are collision, denial of sleep and packet replay etc.  Here SMAC and Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) can be used to detect the anomaly. TDMA [18] is digital 
transmission process where each cluster node will assign different time slots for different 
sensor nodes in its region. During this slot every sensor node has access to the radio 
frequency channel without interference. If any attacker send packet using source address of 
any node, e.g. A, but that slot is not allocated to A then LPA’s Anomaly Processor can easily 
detect that intrusion. S-MAC [18] protocol is used to assign a wakeup and sleep time for the 
sensor nodes. As the sensor has limited power, S-MAC can be implemented for the energy 
conservation. If any packet is received from source e.g. A in its sleeping period then LPA can 
easily detect the inconsistency.   
 
In Network Layer route tracing is used to detect whether the packet really comes from the best 
route. If packet comes to the destination via different path rather than the desired path then the 
Anomaly Processor can detect possible intrusion according to predefined rules.   
Application Layer uses three level watchdogs. They are in base station, regional node, cluster 
node. Sensor nodes will be monitored by upper layer watchdog cluster node and cluster nodes 
will be monitored by regional node watchdog and finally the top level watchdog base station 
will monitor the regional nodes. So, if any one node is compromised by the attacker then 
higher layer watch dog can easily detect the attack and generate alarm.  
 
7. INTRUSION RESPONSE 
There are differences between intrusion detection and intrusion prevention. If a system has 
intrusion prevention, it is assumed that intrusion detection is built in. IDSs are designed to 
welcome intrusion to get into system; where as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) actually 
attempts to prevent access to the system from the very beginning. IPS operates similar to IDS 
with one critical difference: “IPS can block the attack itself; while an IDS sits outside the line 
of traffic and observes, an IPS sits directly in line of network traffic. Any traffic the IPS 
identifies as malicious is prevented from entering the network [19].” So in case of IDS 
“Intrusion Response” should be the right title for recovery.  
 
There are two different approaches for intrusion response: Hot response or Policy based 
response [20].  Hot response reacts by launching local action on the target machine to end 
process, or on the target network component to block traffic. E.g. kill any process, Reset 
connection etc. It does not prevent the occurrence of the attack in future. On the other hand 
Policy based response works on more general scope. It considers the threats reported in the 
alert, constraints and objectives of the information system of the network. It modifies or 
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creates new rules in the policy repository to prevent an attack in the future. In our proposed 
IDS, Base station’s Policy decision point and other policy decision modules take part in the 
response mechanism together. BPDP and PDM take part in response mechanism. Intrusion 
can be detected either in Cluster node or Regional node. Finally base stations can be involved 
anytime if network administrator wants to do so or to update signature database or policy 
stored in intermediate agent. Intrusions are detected automatically according to the policy 
implemented by BPDP. Re-action is also automatic but administrator may re-design the 
architecture according requirements. 
 
In [21] a novel intrusion detection and response system is implemented. We have applied 
their idea in our response mechanism with some modification. Our IDS system considers each 
sensor nodes into one of five classes: Fresh, Member, Unstable, Suspect or Malicious. We 
have Local Policy Agent, Regional Policy Agent and finally Base Policy Decision Point to 
take decision about the sensor node’s class placement. Routeguard mechanism use Pathrating 
algorithm to keep any node within these five classes [21].  In our model, we have policy or 
rules defined in Base station’s BPDP to select any node to be within these five classes as 
shown in figure 4. When a new node is arrived, it will be classified as Fresh. For a pre-
selected period of time this new node will be in Fresh state. By this time LPA will check 
whether this node is misbehaving or not. In this period the node is permitted to forward or 
receive packets from another sensor node, but not its own generated packet. After particular 
time its classification will be changed to Member automatically if no misbehave is detected. 
Otherwise the node’s classification will be changed to Suspect state. In Member state nodes 
are allowed to create, send, receive or forward packets. In this time Member nodes are 
monitored by Watchdog at LPA in Cluster node. If the node misbehaves its state will be 
changed to Unstable for short span of time. During Unstable state nodes are permitted to send 
and receive packets except their own packets. In this state the node will be kept under close 
observation of LPA. If it behaves well then it will be transferred to Member state. A node in 
Unstable state will be converted to Suspect state in two cases: Either the node was in 
Unstable state and interchanged its state within Member and Unstable state for a particular 
amount of times (threshold value defined in LPA) within a predefined period or the node was 
misbehaving for long time (threshold value). LPA’s Post processor sends “Danger alert” to 
RPA whenever Suspect node is encountered. The suspected node is completely isolated from 
the network. It is not allowed to send, receive, or forward packets and temporarily banned for 
short time. Any packets received from suspected node are simply discarded.  After a certain 
period of time the node is reconnected and is monitored closely for extensive period of time 
by Intrusion Detection Agent in all three layers. If watchdogs report well then node status will 
be changed to Unstable. However if it continues misbehaving then it will be labeled as 
Malicious. After declaring any node malicious that node permanently banned from this 
network. To ensure that this malicious node will never try to reconnect, its MAC address or 
any unique ID will be added to Signature Record Database of LPA.  
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Figure 5 : Operation of Intrusion Response 
 
Survivability is one of the major factors that are predicted from every system. We consider 
base stations to be failure free. But the Regional nodes or cluster nodes may be unreachable 
due to failure or battery exhaustion. So, in case of failures or any physical damage of 
Regional nodes or Cluster nodes, control of that node should be taken over by another stable 
node. So in our proposed architecture if any Regional node fails, then its control is shifted to 
the neighbor Regional node dynamically. 
So, control of the Cluster nodes and sensor nodes belonging to that Regional node will be 
shifted automatically to the neighbor node. In the same way if any cluster node fails then 
control of that cluster node will be transferred to the neighbor Cluster node.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  6: Cluster nodes failure 
So in the proposed architecture if any LPA is unreachable due to failure or battery exhaustion 
of cluster nodes, neighbor LPA will take the charges of leaf level sensor nodes which was in 
the area of fault cluster node. In the same way due to Regional nodes failure neighbor 
Regional node’s RPA will take over the functionality of all the cluster node’s LPA and sensor 
nodes belonged to the faulty Regional node dynamically.  
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Figure 7 : Regional node’s failure 
 
As we mentioned before Cluster nodes or regional nodes havenumberdirect communications 
between them. So how will Cluster node or Regional node determine about the failure of its 
neighbor? Actually in the proposed architecture Base station has direct or indirect connections 
with all its leaf nodes. Base station has direct connection with Regional node. So if any 
Regional node fails Base station can identify the problem and select one of its neighbor nodes 
dynamically according to some predefined rule in BPDP. Then BPDP needs to supply the 
policy, rules, or signatures of failed node to the selected new neighbor Regional node. In the 
same way if any cluster node fails then neighbor cluster node will not be informed about its 
failure. So in this case Regional node will take necessary action of selecting suitable neighbor 
cluster node. Here policy, rules or signatures of the failed cluster node will be supplied by the 
BPDP through relevant RPA. So RPA has the only responsibility to select appropriate 
neighbor LPA of unreachable LPA. The rest of the work belongs to BPDP of Base station. As 
Base station is much more powerful node with large storage; all the signatures, anomaly 
detection rules or policies are stored primarily as backup in Base station. This back up system 
increases reliability of the whole network system.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
WSN are prone to intrusions and security threats. In this paper, we propose a novel 
architecture of IDS for ad hoc sensor network based on hierarchical overlay design. We 
propose a response mechanism also according to proposed architecture. Our design of IDS 
improves on other related designs in the way it distributes the total task of detecting intrusion. 
Our model decouples the total work of intrusion detection into a four level hierarchy which 
results in a highly energy saving structure. Each monitor needs to monitor only a few nodes 
within its range and thus needs not spend much power for it. Due to the hierarchical model, 
the detection system works in a very structured way and can detect any intrusion effectively. 
As a whole, every area is commanded by one cluster head so the detection is really fast and 
the alarm is rippled to the base station via the region head enabling it to take proper action. In 
this paper we consider cluster nodes or Regional nodes to be more powerful than ordinary 
sensor nodes. Though it will increase the total cost of network set up, but to enhance 
reliability, efficiency and effectiveness of IDS for a large geographical area where thousands 
of sensor nodes take place, the cost is tolerable. 
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Policy based mechanism is a powerful approach to automating network management. The 
management system for intrusion detection and response system described in this paper 
shows that a well structured reduction in management traffic can be achievable by policy 
management. This policy-based architecture upgrades adaptability and re-configurability of 
network management system which has a good practical research value for large 
geographically distributed network environment.  
 
The IDS in wireless sensor network is an important topic for the research area. Still there are 
no proper IDS in WSN field. Many previous proposed systems were based on three layer 
architecture. But we introduced a four layer overlay hierarchical design to improve the 
detection process and we brought GSM cell concept. We also introduced hierarchical watch 
dog concept. Top layer base station, cluster node and regional node are three hierarchical 
watchdogs. Our report proposes IDS in multiple layers to make our system architecture 
robust.  
 
9. FUTURE WORK 
This paper provides a first-cut solution to four layer hierarchical policy based intrusion 
detection system for WSN. So there is much room for further research in this area. Proposed 
IDS system is highly extensible, in that as new attack or attack pattern are identified, new 
detection algorithm can be incorporated to policy. Possible venues for future works include: 
 
• Present model can be extended by exploring the secure communication between base 
station, Regional node and cluster node. 
• The setting of management functions of manager station more precisely.  
• Election procedure to select cluster and regional node: Instead of choosing the cluster 
node and regional node manually, there will be an election process that will 
automatically detect the cluster node and regional node. 
• Implementation of Risk Assessment System in the manager stations to improve the 
reaction capability of intrusion detection system.  
• In this paper we actually focus on the general idea of architectural design for IDS and 
how a policy management system can be aggregated to the system. But an extensive 
work needs to be done to define Detection and Response policy as well. 
• Overall, more comprehensive research is needed to measure the current efficiency of 
IDS, in terms of resources and policy, so that improvements of its future version(s) 
are possible. 
• Further study is required to determine IDS scalability. To the best of knowledge, its 
scalability highly correlates with the scalability of the WSN application and the 
policy management in use. 
• Building our own Simulator: As all the previous research were based on three layer 
architecture, so we are planning to create our own simulator that will simulate our 
four layer design. 
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